HARNESSING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY TO SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM DESIGN
Security cooperation activities shape the geostrategic environment every time they impact the military relations between international partners. "International relations," as defined by the political scientist K.J. Holsti, "refer to the structured and organized relations between established entities that may or may not become involved in the major political issues of the day." 1 Security cooperation activities are all structured, organized, and formally administered programs that govern interstate interaction between partnered military units and their leaders. These programs are therefore a unique subset of international relations as Holsti defines them. Security cooperation programs aspire to build common expectations with partner nations so that their military assistance is available when needed. In an environment of diminishing defense resources, we can no longer expect to have the manpower, time, or funding available to compensate for either program inefficiencies or poorly targeted activities. It is more important than ever that we find a way to do things correctly at the first opportunity, making informed choices with every partner and program. Security cooperation plans should support national objectives, expand policy options, and eliminate potential surprises from partner nations. They must be deliberately designed from the outset to achieve these objectives.
This paper posits that modern international relations theory should shape our security cooperation activities. It will begin by demonstrating how security cooperation programs increasingly reflect our desire to shape the future geostrategic environment in favor of American national interests. A review of three schools of thought on international relations, the Realist, Constructivist, and Liberal schools, will follow to offer several relevant models for understanding and predicting interstate behavior. This help policy makers predict if their future incentive strategies will bear fruit, and identify best practices about how to achieve their ends.
The scholars of Constructivist international relations theory also recognize the anarchic environment inherent to the Realist school. While most Constructivists acknowledge that there is no higher authority over the state system, they do not believe that the international system lacks a type of order. "Anarchy," notes one of the founding Constructivists, Alexander Wendt, "is what states make of it." 12 Wendt believes that "self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy, and…if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure." 13 Process, of course, is much easier to modify than structure, particularly when a single state actor does not control a system. A poker player can increase his chance of success by learning to play with skill, but he cannot change the rules of the game so that he is always dealt an extra card unless he owns the casino. As such, "the central insight of constructivist thought can perhaps best be conveyed by the notion that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between "brute facts" about the world, which remain true independent of human action, and "social facts" which depend for their existence on socially established conventions." 14 Social conventions, reached only by agreement, are always open to modification and renewal.
Because Constructivists "either argue that anarchy"s consequences for specific political interactions are radically underdetermined, or that the socially constructed nature of anarchy makes it amenable to transformation," 15 their observations offer much to security cooperation planners. By describing an international order that extends beyond a self-help world of black and white policy choices, they expand the field of acceptable policy options and allow for a wider menu of military to military interactions.
Recognizing this offers policy makers many more options to obtain positive behavior from another state.
Constructivists describe an environment where existentialist choices can be made, and individual nations can define themselves and their values through their actions. They generally agree that ideas and identity matter. Some of these characteristics can be used to predict collective behavior. Well-identified norms can discard certain state or cultural behaviors as either highly unlikely or unacceptable.
More aptly, some Constructivist theorists believe that there can be, and in fact is, a community of norms that can regulate interstate behavior and conduct. The creation and maintenance of these norms must therefore be the focus of steady state security cooperation activities, which can carry these norms forward between partners.
Norms, of course, can always take the form of laws, which then brings us to the Liberal school of international relations. The Liberal school is the intellectual precursor to both Realism and Constructivism, and has its origins in the seventeenth century.
Predating the system of secular independent states established under the Treaty of Westphalia, Hugo Grotius "asserted that all international relations were subject to the rule of law -both the law of nations and the law of nature. He rejected the idea that states can do whatever they wish and that war is the supreme right of states." 16 As opposed to the Realist vision of anarchy, Liberals generally agree with Grotius that there is a larger system at work restraining state behavior.
One of the most famous Liberal theorists is the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose theory of "Perpetual Peace" centered on a vision where "free, democratic states would retain their sovereignty while working together to avoid war." 17 Kant"s vision has repeatedly been channeled into a desire to "democratize" other nations in the interest of expanding security, and create regimes whose laws and social mores will be directly 
Three Principal Actors in Program Control
In order to understand how international relations theory can inform our security cooperation policy choices, we must first identify the key actors in the policy process. The RAND team concluded that in order to ascertain whether these outlier programs were effective or not, they had to be compared to the OSD authored Global Employment of the Force (GEF) document. Because they found that "at present, the GEF provides the only real assessment guidance available to the COCOMs, services, and defense support agencies," 27 the Office of the Secretary of Defense must be considered the primary stakeholder in security cooperation, without equal. Sometimes, however, the subjective judgments of diplomats are insufficient.
Detailed knowledge of the needs and desires of a partner country are essential to establishing and maintaining common ground in interstate relations. For security cooperation investments to be judged effective they must always be reviewed by how well they help achieve American security interests throughout the world.
Strategic planners desire, and often require, complete clarity about a potential ally"s abilities and intentions, particularly in moments of crisis. As in the common financial services disclaimer that past behavior is not an indicator of future performance, those strategists charged with forming an international military coalition will require more than historical images and updated organizational charts to sleep soundly at night.
Nowhere are potential policies expressed as hard demands more clearly than in the assumptions of an operations plan (OPLAN). Determining whether the starting assumptions about a coalition partner"s ability or willingness in an OPLAN are valid point us to the final actor in the security cooperation triumvirate, and another school of international relations theory.
The Geographic Combatant Command maintains the library of operations plans (OPLANs) for any given theater. They have a statutory responsibility to maintain and update these plans regularly. 33 The Plans section of the staff (J5) has a key task in identifying the enabling conditions assumed necessary at the start of an OPLAN.
Security cooperation programs with a partner country referenced in an OPLAN should be oriented to support these opening conditions. An intelligence estimate that describes the likelihood a plan may be activated, and how far in the future that likelihood may arise, will determine the time available to develop those conditions. Understanding the time available before a security relationship reaches an inflection point at the start of an OPLAN will then allow the J5 to triage security cooperation activities in the GCC area of responsibility. Programs that support making the most important conditions and assumptions in the most likely OPLANS a reality can then receive a corresponding emphasis. Carrot and stick negotiations at this moment will impress the gravity of the situation in ways that appeals to institutional rules or common values may not.
Because the assumptions in an OPLAN are tied to event triggers that would activate the plan, their relative necessity and importance lend themselves to prediction.
An intelligence estimate tracking the potential activation of an OPLAN would indicate when the assumption conditions were required to be met. Goals can be placed in time,
so an on-off switch of direct quid pro quo security cooperation agreements would likely be sufficient to make sure those goals are realized.
Creating a System of Checks and Balances
History is full of examples of states that supported or abandoned one another in a time of need. Undeniably, the American taxpayer supports security cooperation activities to increase the likelihood that we will have more, rather than less, capable and willing coalition partners to meet our strategic military goals. Security cooperation is Simplifying the number of actors also helps each one focus on discrete goals when pursuing the security cooperation relationship with a foreign government. Perhaps most importantly, all three actors must cooperate continuously to maintain an environment of creative destruction that will ensure security cooperation programs remain relevant. Focusing the efforts of each actor in the triad to a collective goal of promoting US security objectives should help break fiefdoms in program administration, as no one actor can monopolize the intended outcomes for a program, nor discard examination of a security cooperation activity because it is "not in my lane."
Each point in the triad will examine the suite of security cooperation programs from a different point of view only to develop a collective judgment that military assistance is both doing the right thing and doing it well.
The emphasis on purpose and outcomes will be increasingly necessary in the future. As future DOD budgets are expected to decline, military strategists will have less "slack" available in the system, and more reason to get things right the first time. A balanced, informed approach to security cooperation activities and policies is necessary now more than ever.
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